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1Abstract
This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling sys-
tem assuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance
and registration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of property
rights on land under private titling and the two existing public ti-
tling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in the
expected costs of forfeiture balances the higher cost of initial registra-
tion, a registration system is more e±cient than a recording system.
Implications for title assurance, land improvements and transactions
are also considered.
Keywords: land transfer, registration, recording, property rights, title assur-
ance, insurance, adverse selection.
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21 Introduction
The functioning of titling systems in land holds important consequences for
the economy. Investments in land are a®ected by the security of property
rights. Furthermore, land is relatively unmovable so it provides good col-
lateral. Well functioning titling systems therefore promote investment and
reduce the transaction cost of credit. This was well understood by reformers
in the 19th century, when the transition from a system of privacy of prop-
erty rights to one of publicity, either of deeds or rights, was hotly discussed.1
Knowledge on the design of these systems has again become crucial with
the attempts (and repeated failures) to lay out the institutional foundations
of markets in developing and transition economies. As an in°uential writer
suggests, developed societies may have forgotten the blueprints of their ba-
sic institutions in this ¯eld.2 This article, in tandem with previous work by
Arru~ nada (2002, 2003), aims to explain their structure.
Legally, `property rights' are rights in rem, enforced by the courts by
applying a rule of property.3 Right holders are thus protected against future
actions by other people. They are, however, uncertain about the quality
of their title, given that it can be defeated if someone with a better title
appears.4 For instance, an owner is protected against fraudulent conveyance
1See Arru~ nada (2003, p.432, n.75) for references on these discussions.
2See De Soto (2000).
3In the Calabresi and Melamed (1972) sense, who oppose property and liability rules
even if not dealing with the in rem nature of property. When rights on land are enforced as
property rights, they are claimable against the asset itself and are therefore valid against
all persons. They are said to `run with the land,' meaning that they survive unaltered
through all kinds of transactions and transformations dealing with other rights on the
same or neighboring parcels. For example, the mortgagee keeps the same claim on the
land even after the mortgagor sells it. By contrast, contractual rights are enforced only
against a speci¯c person. See also a series of works focusing mainly on the constraints
that legal systems impose on their creation, the so-called `numerus clausus' problem; Heller
(1998, 1999), Buchanan and Yoon, (2000), Merrill and Smith (2000, 2001a, 2001b), and
Hansmann and Kraakman (2002).
4The term `title' may refer to a legal right, as here, or to the evidence of it, often a
3of her land but may lose the land if she bought it from someone who lacked
good title and the legal owner claims it.
This article compares how di®erent legal systems solve this problem,
reducing the uncertainty of property rights. We use as the benchmark a
regime of `privacy', under which the courts enforce property rights in rem
even if they have remained hidden. To the extent that consent of a®ected
right holders (legal owners but also mortgagees, neighbors, public authori-
ties and so on5) is frequently impossible to gather ex ante, because of lack
of information on hidden con°icting rights, most rights remain subject to
substantial uncertainty. They face the risk that a competing property right
might emerge, transforming them into contractual rights so that they con°ict
with the previously hidden rights.
For this reason, modern legal systems only enforce as property rights
those for which either titles or rights themselves are made public, giving rise
to the two systems that we will call `recording' and `registration'.6 Under
recording (e.g., in France and the USA), courts solve con°icts by allocating
property rights according to the date when the private contracts, the deeds,
are ¯led in a public o±ce. This encourages parties to record as soon as
possible and makes it possible for parties and intermediaries to collect the
consent of all a®ected right holders, voluntarily reducing titling con°icts.
Under registration (including the Torrens version), private contracts also get
provisional priority when they are lodged. However, the registrar, acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity, only registers a right if no other rights are damaged or
consent is given by any right holders a®ected. This mandatory requirement
deed. Any ambiguity is easily clari¯ed by context.
5From now on we will use the terms `ownership' and `owner' to refer to the variety of
property rights and right holders in real estate. Current owners are also assumed to be
good faith third party acquirers. In addition, we will refer to the loss of the in rem standing
of a right (caused, for example, by the loss of priority of a mortgage) as `forfeiture' even
if, strictly speaking, this term is only applicable to ownership.
6For sake of simplicity, we abstract from complementary systems, such as adverse
possession, prescription, and quiet title suits.
4of consent removes potential defects and allows the legal system to consider
registered rights as conclusive, changing the liability rule for those necessarily
rare cases in which an error arises. Therefore, innocent third party acquirers
are fully protected when they rely on the register, and keep the land even if a
legal owner appears. A comparable process of gathering consent or `purging'
rights takes place under recording, made possible by the ¯ling requirement
and driven by the voluntary interest of acquirers. However, given the private
and voluntary nature of such purging, the courts necessarily continue to apply
a property rule for allocating property rights in case of title con°ict.
In a series of articles, Miceli et al. model the consequences of using prop-
erty and liability rules for solving title con°icts.7 Generally speaking, these
models (in contrast, for example, with Janczyk, 1977) do not recognize that
registration and recording face di®erent costs and provide di®erent bene¯ts
in terms of lowering the costs of forfeiture and uncertainty. Also, the ¯nd-
ing that registration is e±cient is driven by the assumption that the current
owner values the land more than the claimant. Lastly, they do not consider
privacy.
We solve these shortcomings by building a model that is closer to the pro-
duction functions that experts claim the two systems are able to o®er, with
7In particular, Miceli and Sirmans (1995), argue that (a) if transaction costs after
adjudication are low (most notably, zero transaction costs), both recording and registration
are e±cient, that is, under both systems, the land ends up with the party who values
it most; (b) if transaction costs are high and the current owner values the land more
than the claimant does, registration is usually superior because it awards the land to
the party who values it most; and (c) both the current and the legal owner prefer the
system that awards each of them the land rather than monetary compensation equal to
the market value. In a related work, Miceli, Sirmans and Turnbull (1998) argue in favor of
the superiority of registration because it induces optimal investment on land improvement,
whereas under recording investment is discouraged to the extent that returns on investment
will probably be appropriated by the claimant. Furthermore, Miceli, Sirmans and Turnbull
(2000) show that registration is more e±cient than recording because the potential for
legitimate adverse claims tends to ine±ciently hasten land development in recording. In
the long run, registration is more e±cient because of gains in land improvements, even if
the current owner values the parcel of land less than the claimant.
5registration incurring higher operating costs than pure recording (without
assurance) but also providing higher bene¯ts, and considering that owners
have always the option of privacy. Moreover, we drop the restrictive assump-
tion that current owners necessarily value land more than the claimants. We
investigate if it is more e±cient to implement recording or registration taking
into account two main problems solved by land titling, enforcing property
rights and reducing transaction costs. These more realistic assumptions pro-
duce highly relevant results, as we are able to reveal the hidden costs and
bene¯ts of each titling system, to predict how their comparative advantage
is a®ected by exogenous changes, and to derive testable implications. In par-
ticular, our results suggest that, contrary to previous ¯ndings by Miceli et
al., the relative e±ciency of the di®erent titling systems is unlikely to be re-
solved on purely theoretical grounds. More importantly, our model identi¯es
the crucial dimensions for evaluating both systems empirically.
In our model, choosing recording rather than registration could be more
e±cient because we explicitly consider the possibility of privacy. Registration
is more costly, hence some parcels of land that could be recorded if such a
system was introduced, will remain in what we call privacy, that is, out of
the public system of land titling, and not actually registered. In addition,
the explicit consideration of titling assurance (title `insurance' in the US)
supports the argument because it is socially e±cient to assure highly valuable
parcels of land. While registration assures all registered parcels, recording
with titling assurance only assures the most valuable parcels of land.
The paper goes as follows: in the next section, we discuss the problem
of rights enforcement. Extensions of the model (title assurance, land devel-
opment, and the problem of transaction costs) are considered in section 3.
Final remarks conclude the paper.
62 The Problem of Rights Enforcement
In this section, we model individual titling decisions and social choice of the
optimal land titling system in the presence of uncertainty about the legal
quality of titles, assuming that sellers and buyers have the same information
about title quality, an assumption that will be dropped in subsection 3.3.
We start by considering three classes of titling system for dealing with title
claims, leaving the possibility of title assurance until subsection 3.1.
We consider the possibility of keeping property rights private as an al-
ternative to titling systems, both of which make property rights public. We
assume that current owners do not necessarily record or register their titles,
but may instead rely on keeping them private. Their decision will depend on
a trade-o® of individual costs and bene¯ts. We then model the social decision
to introduce a titling system assuming this individual freedom to record or
register.8 We also assume that more costly titling systems reduce expected
forfeiture costs more signi¯cantly; as well as a higher incidence of claims un-
der recording than under registration, an assumption that is supported by
empirical evidence.
2.1 Individual Choice
In a perfect world, with no uncertainty and no con°icting claims, the value
of a parcel of land would be V . This value will be lower in the real world,
8This freedom is commonly found in reality except in the few jurisdictions in which
registration is required to create or transmit property rights. The extent of this freedom
most commonly depends on the willingness of the law or the courts to grant property,
in rem, status to unrecorded or unregistered possessory rights, which is often done in a
fuzzy way, with the courts imposing strict requirements for a third party acquirer to be
considered in good faith. This fuzziness justi¯es our assumption about the higher incidence
of claims under privacy. For a more detailed analysis of the scope for free choice under
these systems, see Arru~ nada (2003, pp. 428-432). Registration and recording are usually
compulsory, however, for abstract rights, such as mortgages, in all jurisdictions.
7however. Let µ be the marginal reduction of the private value of land due
to expected costs of forfeiture, which is common knowledge for sellers and
buyers.9
We consider three di®erent classes of system for land titling. Under
privacy, the marginal expected cost of forfeiture is µ0 : 0 < µ0 < 1. If the
current owner does not record or register the deeds, the expected value of
ownership would be (1 ¡ µ0)V , where the expected cost of forfeiture is µ0V
(see Figure 1).10
<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE>
Under recording, the marginal expected cost of forfeiture is µ1 : 0 < µ1 <
µ0 < 1, and the expected value of ownership would then be (1 ¡ µ1)V ¡ R,
where R is the private cost of recording, including the explicit price as well
as other implicit costs. We assume that the marginal cost of forfeiture is
9Forfeiture costs include potential loss of the land for its current owner, transaction
costs in future transactions, including those incurred to make transactions possible and op-
portunity losses from transactions that will not take place due to the remaining uncertainty,
all costs measured in probabilistic terms (this would therefore include the `demoralization'
costs considered in Michelman's (1967) seminal work). We model these forfeiture costs
as a percentage of the value of the land. Implicitly, we therefore assume that forfeiture
costs exhibit constant returns to scale, thus the marginal expected cost of forfeiture is
constant within a given titling system. Presumably, higher valued parcels of land are in
fact subject to a higher probability of forfeiture for a given level of title assurance, thus
incurring a higher marginal expected cost of forfeiture. Consideration of this characteristic
would make the exercise more cumbersome, but there is no reason to think that the results
obtained should not replicate those we suggest.
10The marginal expected cost of forfeiture under privacy is assumed to be independent
of the titling system chosen by the government. Explicitly considering this dependence in
the model would only modify the value of social welfare but not the observed fundamental
divergence between the private and social motives for recording or registering land. Fur-
thermore, it is unclear in which direction such dependence should go. On the one hand,
one might be tempted to argue that privacy bene¯ts from the existing public system, that
is, that it free rides on the more e®ective public system (through a mechanism of general
deterrence of claims, for instance). On the other hand, the stronger e®ects of public titling
may be abused to fabricate claims on private titles. For instance, if neighboring land is
registered rather than recorded, an owner should check that its boundaries are correctly
de¯ned.
8greater under privacy, that is, µ1 < µ0, because recording eliminates some
claims which might be possible; in particular, those originated by any sub-
sequent deeds granted by the former grantor. The choice between privacy
and recording is determined by comparing the cost of recording, R, with this
gain from reducing the marginal expected cost of forfeiture, (µ0 ¡ µ1)V .
Under registration, the marginal expected cost of forfeiture is given by
µ2 : 0 < µ2 < µ1 < µ0 < 1. The owner will then get (1¡µ2)V ¡Q, where Q is
the private cost of registration, including the explicit price as well as other
implicit costs. The marginal expected cost of forfeiture in registration is not
zero because even if, under registration, owners in good faith do not su®er
any forfeiture risk linked to former claims, they still su®er some chance of
losing their property because of a registration mistake in the future.11
As Figure 1 shows, if the three options are available, an individual owning
land of value V would rely on privacy when the land is not very valuable,
would record if its value is within a given interval, and would register if the
land is highly valuable.12 Also note that the di®erence between the forty-
¯ve degree line (utility in the perfect world) and the expected utility for the
preferred titling system is greater for higher land values.13 In particular,
11Nevertheless notice that greater e®ectiveness of registration in reducing the marginal
expected cost of forfeiture is also supported by the consideration that, without a very low
probability of forfeiture for legal owners, the use of a liability rule becomes unsustainable.
With a substantial number of failures, the application of a liability rule bankrupts the
registration system to the extent that it is eventually abolished (as was the case with the
Torrens registers in many US jurisdictions).
12In Figure 1, it is assumed that (µ0 ¡µ2)R < (µ0 ¡µ1)Q. Otherwise, recording is never
preferred.
13Owners choose between the available titling options according to the present value
of law, which incorporates expectations of future value. Individual titling choices are
bound to become outdated as prices move up or down, but in an asymmetric fashion:
while owners of revaluated land could easily `title up,' owners of depreciated land cannot
title down (choosing privacy) and would have therefore invested too much in recording or
registering their now depreciated land. Two quali¯cations are in order. First, this loss
would be short-lived because right holders would return to privacy for future transactions
so their losses would be limited to the costs sunk in one instance of publicity. Second,
9given that individuals are assumed to be risk neutral, any current owner of
land valued V would prefer privacy if (µ0 ¡ µ1)V < R and (µ0 ¡ µ2)V < Q;
recording if (µ0 ¡ µ1)V > R and (µ1 ¡ µ2)V < Q ¡ R; registration otherwise.
2.2 Social Choice
The enforcement of land claims generates not only private but also social
costs when transferred from current owners to rightful claimants (in privacy
and recording) or from current owners to wrongful owners (in registration).
The possibility of these nonconsensual transfers is socially costly because
they trigger rent-seeking and, generally, transaction costs, especially to make
future consensual transactions possible and to protect against fraud.14 We
assume that these social costs are a percentage of the private cost of forfeiture,
¸, such that 0 < ¸ < 1.15
given the higher cost of registration, the loss would be greater under registration.
14For instance, real resources are spent in fabricating frauds and litigating disputes on
current ownership. Also, future land sales become more di±cult when titles are unclear.
Furthermore, our rationale is applicable to all kinds of property rights, even those in which
possession plays no role (as in mortgages), rather than only to ownership. Nor does our
model rely on particular assumptions about who indemni¯es the losing party (that is, the
wrong owner under recording, the legal owner under registration). From a social viewpoint,
it is not important because we consider social welfare in a purely utilitarian way (thus, the
indemni¯cation to the losing party is cancelled out by the payment made by the winning
party). From an individual viewpoint, we can interpret the loss from forfeiture as a loss
after indemni¯cation.
15In general, we would expect ¸ < 1 since individuals will typically bear a higher ex-
pected private cost than the expected social cost (amongst other reasons, because a transfer
of land bene¯ts other individuals in the economy). However, for technical completeness,
we allow for the possibility that ¸ ¸ 1; so the possibility that forfeiture might generate
substantial rent-seeking is considered. Also notice that our rationale is analytically equiv-
alent, but does not rely on, the assumption made by Miceli et al. (1998) whereby current
owners value land more than claimants. In other words, both rationales are formally sim-
ilar but ours is grounded on costs instead of preferences. More importantly, in Miceli et
al.(1998), this assumption is critical for deriving the result that a registration system is
more e±cient than a recording system. In our model, when ¸ = 0, the socially optimal
titling system is privacy since both recording and registration generate costs and no bene-
¯t. Later on, when land improvements are considered as in subsection 3.2. below, that is
10To identify the social optimum, let us suppose that in a given economy
the value of land V is distributed with a probability density function f(V ),
and a cumulative density function F(V ) in the interval [0; ¹ V ], and let us
normalize the quantity of land to one. In each titling system, social welfare
is given by the social value of the parcels of land which remain under privacy
and those whose titles are ¯led in the available public titling system. This
aggregated value is given by the area below the broken lines represented in
Figures 2 and 3 for privacy and either recording or registration.
<INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE>
<INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE>
When the government chooses recording, social welfare is given by two
integrands representing the social net bene¯ts from privacy and recording,





(1 ¡ µ0¸)V dF(V ) +
Z ¹ V
R=(µ0¡µ1)
[(1 ¡ µ1¸)V ¡ r]dF(V ) (1)
Similarly, when the government chooses registration, social welfare is
given by two integrands representing the social net bene¯ts from privacy and
no longer true. When ¸ is zero, privacy is not necessarily superior because the incentives
for land improvement are diminished.





(1 ¡ µ0¸)V dF(V ) +
Z ¹ V
Q=(µ0¡µ2)
[(1 ¡ µ2¸)V ¡ ½]dF(V ) (2)
Social welfare is maximized when prices of recording and registration
equal their respective social cost, that is, R = r=¸ and Q = ½=¸. Given that
the social cost of registering land ½ is greater than the social cost of recording
r, that is, ½ > r, the price for registration should be higher than the price
for recording.17
More importantly, in both recording and registration, prices should be
higher than individual marginal costs as long as social costs are positive but
16The variable cost of each system is explicitly included, assuming that the marginal
cost of registration is higher than that of recording. This is consistent with the assumed
probabilities of forfeiture under the two systems. In choosing this set of assumptions, our
purpose is to model the essential features of the di®erent titling technologies (that is, their
di®erent costs and e®ectiveness in reducing title uncertainty). Assumptions about costs
and e®ectiveness are, of course, open to criticism. We have endeavored to introduce in
the model the parametric di®erences we think are generally accepted in the literature.
The scant empirical evidence available also supports that registration incurs higher costs
but reduces the probability of forfeiture more than recording does (Janczyk 1977; Shick
and Plotkin 1978; Miceli et. al. 2002). Nevertheless we must recognize that we assume
that the costs of both recording and registration do not vary with land value and that the
prices charged for both kinds of service also remain constant with land value. However,
the results should not be a®ected by this assumption because, were we to allow costs to
vary with land value, prices would also vary with land value. In this case, we should look
for the appropriate two-tier tari® (which is usually applied in practice), instead of the ¯xed
prices. Finally, there are no ¯xed costs related to the (¯rst time) creation of registration
or recording o±ces. Only variable costs are considered. Creating a registration system is
surely more costly than a recording system, but this cost di®erence lies mainly in greater
variable costs at the time of initial registration, not in the ¯xed costs of starting up the
system. When title assurance is added to recording, it may even incur larger ¯xed costs
than registration, due to the duplication of title plants (Arru~ nada, 2002).
17Notice, however, that if we had taken the view that registration and recording di®er
not only in the marginal expected cost of forfeiture, µ, but also in the social cost incurred,
¸, this conclusion would not necessarily hold because, for example, the stricter numerus
clausus required by registration. Also, in subsection 3.2. when we consider land im-
provements, a di®erent result would be obtained since registration generates more capital
improvements and thus is socially more bene¯cial.
12lower than individual costs (that is, 0 < ¸ < 1) because current owners do
not take into account that, if a claim takes place, the social loss is less than
the private loss.18 Thus, owners will ¯le titles that, from a social standpoint,
would better remain private.
The choice between recording and registration should be based on com-
paring W rc and W rg. Because privacy is a viable alternative, whatever the
titling system, adopting recording or registration as the titling system not
only places land in one or the other titling system, potentially causing over-
and under-assurance (the second term in both expressions, (1) and (2)), but
also leads owners to move their land out of the titling system and into pri-
vacy, generating a crowding-out e®ect (the ¯rst term in both expressions, (1)
and (2)). For each, recording and registration, there is a breakeven point in
terms of land value such that an individual is indi®erent between relying on
privacy or on the public system. Notice that it is not clear which of the two
breakeven points is higher.
In particular, let us de¯ne V0 = r=[¸(µ0 ¡ µ1)] and V1 = ½=[¸(µ0 ¡ µ2)],
which are the socially optimal critical land values, conditional on optimal
pricing, at which there is no di®erence for the marginal current owner between
keeping the title under privacy or, respectively, recording or registering it.
Notice that it is not clear which of the two critical values is higher. The price
for initial registration is higher than that of recording, but the reduction in
the marginal expected cost of forfeiture is also higher under a registration
system than under a recording system.
18We have here a version of the familiar problem of excessive level of care when private
bene¯ts are higher than social bene¯ts. See, for example, Shavell (1997).
13If recording has the lowest critical value (V0 · V1), recording should be










[(µ2 ¡ µ1)¸V + ½ ¡ r]dF(V ) ¸ 0 (3)
However, if registration has the lowest critical value (V0 > V1), recording










[(µ2 ¡ µ1)¸V + ½ ¡ r]dF(V ) < 0 (4)
The second and last terms in (3) and (4) refer to the parcels of land that
will be recorded in a recording system and registered in a registration system,
that is, those that will be inside the system.
The ¯rst term in (3) and (4) has similar interpretations, but with di®erent
implications. In (3), it is the net increase in value associated with the parcels
of land that will be recorded in a recording system and just under privacy in
a registration system. However, in (4), the ¯rst term refers to land that will
be under privacy in a recording system and would have been registered if a
registration system were available.
In (3), the ¯rst term is positive: a recording system is better for these
parcels of land because, under a registration system, they are only subject
to privacy (they are out of the system). The last term is very likely to
be negative if the more valuable parcels tend to be registered rather than
recorded, as it would be if they incur higher transaction costs, which seems
likely. Thus, if the ¯rst term dominates the second, the condition in (3) is
satis¯ed and recording is socially preferred to registration.
14We obtain an unambiguous result for (4). The ¯rst term is now negative:
a registration system is better for these parcels of land because, under a
recording system, owners prefer to rely on privacy without entering the public
titling system. The last term is also negative for the same reason: they
have to use recording when it would be worthwhile to register. In this case,
registration is unambiguously preferred to recording.
In Figure 2, recording has the lowest breakeven point. There are parcels
of land that would be inside the system with recording but outside the system
under registration. Area A is land that would be optimally recorded, but
remains under privacy in registration; area B is land that would be optimally
recorded, but is registered in registration; and area C is land that would be
optimally registered, but remains recorded in recording. Figure 3 shows the
opposite situation, where registration has the lowest breakeven point. Area
D is land that would be optimally registered, but its owners rely on privacy
under recording; and area E is land that would be optimally registered, but
is recorded.19
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>
Tables 1 and 2 identify the welfare gains and losses for each set of parcels
of land. Clearly, D plus E is strictly positive, however C minus A minus
B could be negative, depending on the relative magnitude of A plus B and
C. The socially preferred titling system is registration if C > A + B, and
recording if C < A + B.
Our result means that recording may be socially preferable to registration
19These welfare gains would be a®ected by changes in land value. A general increase in
value would be equivalent to moving the whole distribution of land to the right of Figure 2,
increasing area C and making registration preferable. This could account for the dominant
move of developed countries from both privacy (England) and recording (Scotland, parts
of Canada) towards registration or improved recording (France and even the US, when
considering private title plants).
15for two reasons, both of them disregarded in the previous literature. The
¯rst is the higher marginal cost of registration over recording. The second
that, because registration is more costly, some parcels of land that would
be recorded under recording would remain privately titled, so missing the
bene¯ts of publicity under registration.20
3 Extensions
We extend here the previous analysis to consider title assurance, land devel-
opment, and transaction costs, showing how these three aspects may a®ect
the basic results derived before.
3.1 Title Assurance
In the basic model, we ignored the possibility that current owners can buy
`title assurance' services, understood as the private production of information
and contractual services that reduces the probability of forfeiture.21 We will
consider title assurance only under recording because, in essence, it is less
necessary under registration and less viable under privacy.22
20Note also why such an important result could not be reached by Miceli et al. (1998).
For them, recording is always inferior because they assume cost-free titling (r = ½ = 0)
and, more critically, they disregard the possibility of privacy.
21We assume individuals are risk neutral. Thus, there is no risk motivation for insurance
and no social cost from ine±cient risk sharing. Hence we designate activities that reduce
the probability of forfeiture as `title assurance' rather than `title insurance.'
22As in Miceli et al. (1998), we take the view that title assurance makes little sense under
registration since the registration itself provides full title assurance. This is so because,
as analyzed by Arru~ nada (2002), the low level of title insurance sold in countries with
registration merely spreads title risk whereas in countries with recording it aims to prevent
such risks. In the case of privacy, we assume title assurance is unavailable because of the
di±culties of producing information when hidden property rights are legally enforceable.
This is also true as, for land under privacy, precedents of title insurance were limited to
occasional provision of a general third-party guarantee against forfeiture and defective title
16The current owner of a parcel of land valued at V who were o®ered the
full range of institutional solutions would just rely on privacy when the land
is not very valuable; would record if its value is within a given interval; would
buy title assurance services if the land is valuable but not su±ciently so to
justify registration; and would register if the land is highly valuable. See a
more comprehensive model fully developed in appendix A.
The choice of assurance by individuals is not socially optimal because
owners do not care about the bene¯t of involuntary land transferring (unless
transaction costs are such that ¸ = 1). Thus, an individual will choose more
(when ¸ < 1) or less (when ¸ > 1) assurance than is socially desirable. Some
tax or regulation of private pricing for assurance services is therefore needed
to reach the socially optimal level.23
Under recording with title assurance, social welfare is no longer given
by expression (1), but must take into account that some parcels of land will
be recorded without title assurance while others will be recorded with title
assurance. With respect to social welfare, title assurance introduces a bene¯t
(the reduction in transaction costs due to forfeiture becomes less likely) and
a cost (that of producing the assurance itself). However, under registration,
social welfare is still given by expression (2), as before, since there is no
private title assurance.
Assurance services somehow alleviate what is a main de¯ciency of pure
recording: leaving titles on highly valuable land subject to too much uncer-
tainty. Therefore, the possibility of title assurance improves the standing
of recording as compared to registration and, in the spirit of Figure 3, it
increases A and B and reduces C, thus making A + B ¡ C more likely to
insurance policies for speci¯c and known risks (Arru~ nada 2002, 592-593).
23There is some casual evidence of special taxation. The industry is heavily regulated
both in the USA and France. Special taxation takes the form of documentary, mortgage,
and transaction taxes which are frequently associated with the use of assurance recording
services.
17be positive. However, the ¯nal result hinges on the ability of the assurance
technology to reduce the likelihood of forfeiture at a reasonable low cost. If
this is possible, a recording system becomes less of a problem for the most
valuable parcels of land thus diluting to some extent the major advantage
of registration. If not, we might end up with no title assurance and a result
very close to that of subsection 2.2. In addition, if corrective taxation is not
well designed, a recording system with title assurance will su®er distortion
caused by individuals who, not caring about the bene¯t of involuntary land
transferring, tend to buy more than socially optimal assurance services.
3.2 Land Development
Most of the literature on property rights in land has been concerned with
land investment and the nature and enforcement of such property rights.24
It is therefore important that our conclusions remain valid when capital im-
provements are considered. A short technical digression will show why. See
a more comprehensive model fully developed in appendix B.
Parcels of land are worth more after being improved. If the level of cap-
ital improvements is k and the cost of capital improvements (whatever the
titling system) is C(k), where C0 > 0 and C00 > 0, the return on capital
improvements is (1 + k)V . For each titling system, the expected value of
ownership would be (1 ¡ µi)(1 + k)V ¡ C(k), where i = 0;1;2. The choice
of improvements, ki, is given by (1 ¡ µi)V = C0(ki), since the appropriate
second-order condition is satis¯ed. By comparing the three ¯rst-order con-
ditions, we can conclude that the private choice of improvements satis¯es
k2 > k1 > k0. As we should expect, there will more investment in land if
the parcel is registered than recorded or the deeds are kept private. As a
consequence, a parcel of land worth V will have di®erent values after im-
24For example, see Feder and Feeny (1991); Anderson and Lueck (1992); Ellickson
(1993); Besley (1995); Alston, Libecap and Schneider (1996); and Miceli et. al. (1998).
18provements, depending on how it is titled; it will be more valuable if it is
registered rather than recorded or just held under privacy. This e®ect makes
registration more suitable for encouraging land improvements.
A second important result is that the private choice of land improve-
ments is not socially optimal, because individuals do not recognize the pos-
itive externality such improvements will have for potential claimants. Ef-
¯cient land improvement for a given system of land titling should satisfy
(1 ¡ ¸µi)V = C0(ki) for i = 0;1;2. There is over-investment in land im-
provement if ¸ > 1, and under-investment if ¸ < 1. Therefore, some sort of
corrective policy would be needed to achieve socially e±cient land improve-
ment. If transaction costs from forfeiture are relatively low, investment would
be subsidized, whereas if transactions costs are very signi¯cant, it would be
taxed.
Thirdly, social welfare under recording or registration is no longer given
by (1) and (2), but must include the gains and costs from land improvement.
In addition, investment in land and, consequently, land value are higher for
registered than for recorded land, and are lowest for land held under privacy.
The possibility of land improvements therefore exerts two opposite e®ects.
On one hand, registration becomes socially more valuable because it leads to
more investment, thus making registration superior to recording.25 However,
the cost of leaving land outside of the public titling system also becomes
higher because investment is lowest for land held under privacy. When these
two e®ects are combined, it is unclear how land improvements a®ect the
possibility of registration being socially more e±cient than recording.
25A similar conclusion is obtained by Miceli et. al. (1998).
193.3 The Problem of Transaction Costs
A major feature of the literature on property rights is the importance of
land titling for transactions.26 Creating the right incentives for voluntary
transactions in land is important because, in order to guarantee e±ciency,
those who value land more should be able to buy from those who value it
less. We also need to avoid involuntary transactions by which an individual
who values the land more loses it to an individual who values it less.
In this section, we consider the possibility that the seller has better infor-
mation than the buyer concerning the cost of forfeiture due to future claims.
In terms of our model, this means that the di®erent µs are private infor-
mation. The buyer knows that µi is distributed in a given interval, where
i = 0;1;2 stands for privacy, recording and registration respectively; and
she o®ers a price P to the seller in a competitive market.27 The expected
payo® for a risk neutral seller is P ¡(1¡µi)V S. Given the price P, the seller
accepts the o®er as long as µi is greater than 1¡P=V S. Here we can see the
adverse selection problem: For a given P o®ered by the buyer, the seller is
only willing to sell if the marginal cost of forfeiture (unknown to the buyer)
is reasonably high. As a consequence, parcels of land with high quality ti-
tle will not be traded. See a more comprehensive model fully developed in
appendix C.
Given the decision of the seller concerning whether or not to sell, the
buyer will choose the price so as to maximize the expected payo® subject to
zero pro¯ts. Consequently, the price P will necessarily be below the value
of the land for the buyer, it will decrease with the expected marginal cost of
forfeiture due to future claims, and will be below the expected bene¯t for the
seller for those parcels of land with low marginal cost of forfeiture (adverse
26See Arru~ nada (2003) and references therein.
27Therefore, a zero expected pro¯t condition will be imposed as a `participation con-
straint' for the buyer.
20selection).
Clearly, prices will be highest for registered, in between for recorded, and
lowest for privately held land. Therefore, the adverse selection problem will
be less marked for registered, in between for recorded, and most marked for
privately held land. The rationale is the following: The expected marginal
cost of forfeiture is higher for recorded than for registered land; as a conse-
quence, the price o®ered by the buyer will be higher for registered than for
recorded land. A lower price for recorded land drives the better (in terms of
secure land title) parcels out of the market, and a higher price for registered
land keeps some of the better parcels of land in the market.
The explicit inclusion of land transactions therefore creates two opposite
e®ects. On one hand, registration becomes socially more valuable because
there is less adverse selection and more transactions. On the other hand,
the cost of leaving land outside of the public titling system also increases
because adverse selection is highest under privately held land. When these
two e®ects are combined, it is also unclear how the explicit consideration of
land transactions will a®ect the possibility of recording being socially more
or less e±cient than registration.
4 Conclusion
In this article we have explored the choice of titling system for land, intro-
ducing well-established relations about the relative costs and e®ectiveness
of three possibilities: private titling (that is, privacy) and the public titling
systems of registration of rights and recording of deeds (the latter with and
without `private assurance' services, which may take the form of private title
`insurance').
In our model, once a public titling system is in place, owners choose to
21rely on public titling or to keep their rights private. Consequently, the social
choice of title system is given by the net balance of the following e®ects:
recording causes under-assurance of higher value land, while registration
causes crowding out and over-assurance of lower value land. The net bal-
ance of these e®ects and, therefore, the optimal title system are determined
by the relative cost e®ectiveness and pricing of titling (including private `ti-
tle assurance services'). Recording triggers under-assurance of land which
is recorded under recording but, given its greater value, would be e±ciently
registered. Conversely, crowding out happens under registration because
its higher price leads owners to keep private some lower value land which
otherwise would have been recorded. Similarly, some mid-value land that
would have been recorded under recording is registered under registration,
causing over-assurance. These results are quite general, as they hold, with
minor di®erences, for situations with and without private assurance services,
land improvements and information asymmetry between sellers and buyers
of land.
We acknowledge that our results are based on a stylized description of the
di®erent titling systems and are more relevant for jurisdictions with no public
titling. In addition, we have focused on the ideal models of each system. For
instance, assuming that title assurance under recording can never do better
in terms of bene¯ts than registration is probably true of the best examples
of each system, but dysfunctional registration systems surely perform worse
than good recording plus assurance. We think that this assumption, however,
is not too restrictive for the problem we are modeling because performances
of alternative systems within the same jurisdiction are likely to be positively
correlated. The poor performance of registration systems which functioned
simultaneously with recording, as the Torrens register did in Cook county,
is not necessarily relevant for this discussion, because the simultaneous, not
alternative, presence of both systems complicates the comparison with issues
of adverse selection and additional rent seeking.
22Notwithstanding, our results hold important policy implications, which
are consistent with institutional observations. First, whatever the titling
system, the pricing of public titling and private assurance services above
cost is essential for social e±ciency because, as forfeiture has greater private
than social costs, marginal cost pricing would produce over-assurance. This
provides a justi¯cation for taxing land transactions, to the extent that this
tax, which is often linked to public ¯ling, acts as an above-cost price that
limits owners' inclination to over-assure.
Second, the choice of titling system should consider the over- and under-
assurance and crowding out e®ects, as well as the possibility of avoiding
them through both corrective pricing and/or intermediate legal solutions. In
particular, the Government could limit the crowding out e®ect of registration
by pricing titling services in a way that motivates owners of intermediate-
value land to register. More generally, our results provide a rationale for
providing legal palliatives under both registration and recording, which avoid
their speci¯c disadvantages.
Both prescriptions ¯nd empirical support in the functioning of most ti-
tling systems, as all around the world private assurance is heavily regulated
and taxed, reducing over-assurance, and land registers apply prices that in-
crease with land value and include a ¯xed element, which might reduce crowd-
ing out and keep the lowest-value land under privacy. In addition, palliatives
are also widespread. Recording systems often provide a simpli¯ed judicial
procedure to clear title (the French purge and the American quiet title suit),
a solution to the under-assurance of the most valuable land. Registration
systems usually also allow some kind of inexpensive ¯ling with lesser, or pro-
visional, legal e®ects. This often takes the form of provisional registration of
possessory title, which can be considered a form of recording within a regis-
ter of rights and substantially reduces the crowding out and over-assurance
e®ects.
23More generally, the article con¯rms that the choice of an e±cient titling
system is an empirical issue, which cannot be solved on purely theoretical
grounds. It throws two doubts on the certainties that seem to inspire the
huge e®orts being made by international aid agencies in the development of
land titling systems. First, it points to the division between the private and
social bene¯ts of title assurance activities. Second, it models the behavior
of individuals opting out of ¯ling systems, a common circumstance often
forgotten in over-ambitious titling initiatives.
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Appendix A: Formal Model with Title Assur-
ance
A provider of title assurance investigates the standing of the title, reducing
the likelihood of forfeiture. For a given level of e®ort, the marginal expected
cost of forfeiture borne by the current owner is µ(n) : 0 < µ2 < µ(n) <
µ1 < µ0 < 1, where n is e®ort (cost) to reduce the expected marginal cost of
forfeiture, µ(0) = µ1, limn!1 µ(n) = µ2, µ0 < 0, µ00 > 0. The price for title
assurance is S.
The expected value for a current owner who buys title assurance is (1 ¡
µ(n))V ¡ R ¡ S. Thus, an owner decides on title assurance if the gain
(µ1 ¡ µ(n))V is more than the cost S.
Easy computation allows us to say28:
Any current owner of land valued V would prefer:
(a) Privacy if (µ0 ¡ µ1)V < R, (µ0 ¡ µ2)V < Q, and (µ0 ¡ µ(n))V < R + S;
28It is assumed that (µ1 ¡ µ(n))R < (µ0 ¡ µ1)S and (µ1 ¡ µ2)S < (µ1 ¡ µ(n))(Q ¡ R).
Otherwise recording or title assurance would never be preferred because the prices to be
paid would not be compensated for by the lower likelihood of forfeiture.
27(b) Recording if (µ0 ¡µ1)V > R, (µ1 ¡µ2)V < Q¡R, and (µ1 ¡µ(n))V < S;
(c) Recording with Title Assurance if (µ0 ¡µ(n))V > R+S, (µ(n)¡µ2)V <
Q ¡ R ¡ S, and (µ1 ¡ µ(n))V > S;
(d) Registration if otherwise.
The pro¯ts for a provider of title assurance services are S ¡n per parcel
of land `assured.' In a perfectly competitive market, we will have S = n
(zero pro¯t constraint). Thus, the expected value for an owner who buys
title assurance is (1 ¡ µ(n))V ¡ R ¡ n. The amount of assurance bought
by an owner with a parcel of land valued V is n¤ given by ¡µ0(n¤) = 1=V ,
where n¤ increases by V . Owners with more valuable parcels of land will
want to buy more title assurance. Moreover, the likelihood of forfeiture is
endogenous and varies negatively with V .
De¯ne V ¤ as ¡1=µ0(0). Obviously, owners for whom V · V ¤ do not buy
title assurance because it is not worthwhile for them to do so. On the other
hand, owners for whom V > V ¤ buy title assurance. We can think of V ¤
as measure of assurance technology. The lower V ¤, the more e±cient the
technology will be.






(1 ¡ µ0¸)V dF(V ) +
Z V ¤
R=(µ0¡µ1)
[(1 ¡ µ1¸)V ¡ r]dF(V )
+
Z ¹ V
V ¤[(1 ¡ µ(n
¤(V ))¸)V ¡ n
¤(V ) ¡ r]dF(V ) (5)
where we assume that V ¤ > r=[¸(µ0 ¡ µ1)], otherwise everyone who records
necessarily buys title assurance. When a government chooses a registration
system, social welfare is given by (2) as before, since there is no need for
private title assurance.
28The socially optimal pricing vector < R;Q > is the same as in section 2.2.
The possibility of title assurance does not a®ect optimal pricing because the
owner at the margin between recording and privacy does not buy assurance.
The choice of assurance by individuals is not socially optimal because
owners do not care about bene¯ts generated by involuntary land transferring
(unless of course transaction costs are such that ¸ = 1). Thus, an individual
will choose more (¸ < 1) or less (¸ > 1) assurance than is socially desirable.
Let us modify the expected value for an owner who buys title assurance to
take into account taxation: (1 ¡ µ(n))V ¡ R ¡ (1 + t)n, where t is the tax
rate. The amount of resources bought by an owner with a parcel of land
valued at V is now given by ¡µ0(n¤)V = 1 + t. Social welfare is the same as
in (5) since taxes are assumed to be a (neutral) transfer from individuals to
the government. It can be easily checked that the social optimal value for n
should satisfy ¡µ0(n¤)V ¸ = 1. Consequently, the tax rate should be given
by ¡µ0(n¤)(1 ¡ ¸)V .
Positive taxation is socially optimal as long as ¸ < 1, and negative tax-
ation is socially optimal as long as ¸ > 1. Moreover, the lower ¸ is, the
higher the tax rate will be. Another important observation is that owners of
higher-valued land should pay higher taxes because the di®erence between
the private value (V ) and the social value (¸V ) of assurance increases by V .
Once the appropriate tax rate is set, the individual choice of assurance is
socially optimal. Furthermore, V ¤ should be re-de¯ned as ¡1=(µ0(0)¸). The
measure of assurance technology is negatively a®ected by ¸. The rationale
is that, as ¸ goes down, assurance becomes socially less valuable so fewer
owners buy it, and V ¤ should go up.
When modeling the choice made by a government which takes into ac-
count the possibility of private title assurance when deciding between record-
ing and registration, there are three possible cases depending on the limits
of integration. De¯ne as before V0 = r=[¸(µ0 ¡ µ1)] and V1 = ½=[¸(µ0 ¡ µ2)].
29If recording has the lowest critical value (V0 · V1 < V ¤), where assurance
technology is highly ine±cient and registration is relatively costly, recording







[(µ0 ¡ µ1)¸V ¡ r]dF(V ) +
Z V ¤
V1
[(µ2 ¡ µ1)¸V + ½ ¡ r]dF(V )
+
Z ¹ V
V ¤[(µ2 ¡ µ(n
¤(V ))¸V + ½ ¡ r ¡ n
¤(V )]dF(V ) ¸ 0 (6)
However, if registration has the lowest critical value (V1 < V0 < V ¤),







[(µ2 ¡ µ0)¸V + ½]dF(V ) +
Z V ¤
V0
[(µ2 ¡ µ1)¸V + ½ ¡ r)dF(V )
+
Z ¹ V
V ¤[(µ2 ¡ µ(n
¤(V ))¸V + ½ ¡ r ¡ n
¤(V ))dF(V ) < 0 (7)
Yet, if recording has the lowest critical value (V0 < V ¤ · V1), where as-
surance technology is reasonably e±cient and registration is relatively costly,







[(µ0 ¡ µ1)¸V ¡ r]dF(V )
+
Z V1
V ¤ [(µ0 ¡ µ(n
¤(V ))¸V ¡ n





¤(V ))¸V + ½ ¡ n
¤(V ) ¡ r]dF(V ) ¸ 0 (8)
For low values of V , in both systems, land will just rely on privacy as
seen before. Also, as in the basic model developed in the paper, for high
values of V , land will be recorded with assurance in a recording system and
registered in a registration system (last term in (6), (7) and (8)). It is for
the intermediate range of values that we get di®erent characterizations.
30In (6), land will be recorded without assurance in a recording system but
will rely on privacy in a registration system (¯rst term). For the following
set of values, land will be recorded without assurance in a recording system
and registered in a registration system (second term).
In (7), land will be registered in a registration system but will rely on
privacy in a recording system (¯rst term). For the following set of values,
land will be recorded without assurance in a recording system and registered
in a registration system (second term).
In (8), land will be recorded without assurance in a recording system but
will rely on privacy in a registration system (¯rst term). For the following
set of values, land will be recorded with assurance in a recording system but
still relying on privacy in a registration system (second term).
The expressions will depend on what happens for intermediate values,
that is, whether or not we can get these parcels of land into the public land
titling system.
In (6), the ¯rst term is positive: a recording system is better for these
parcels of land because, under a registration system, only privacy takes place.
The second and third terms are likely to be negative, because highly valuable
parcels of land should be registered rather than recorded (with or without
assurance). Thus, if the ¯rst term dominates the other two, recording is
socially preferred to registration. Notice that this is the case we have de-
scribed above as highly ine±cient assurance technology and relatively costly
registration. This case is also very similar to the ¯rst case in the basic model
(when title assurance is not available), where (6) is similar to (3) when V ¤
tends to ¹ V .
In (7), the three terms are negative: registration is preferred to recording.
This case is very similar to the second case in the basic model (when title
assurance is not available), where (7) is similar to (4) when V ¤ tends to ¹ V .
31It is (8) that is new in some regards in comparison with the basic model.
The ¯rst term is positive and the last term is negative as in (6). However,
the second term could be negative or positive, depending on how much more
expensive it is to record with assurance rather than just privately title. Thus,
if the last term is dominated by the other two, recording is socially preferred
to registration.
Appendix B: Formal Model with Land Improve-
ment
Once we identify the private choice of land improvement after corrective
taxation so that (1 ¡ ¸µi)V = C0(ki) for i = 0;1;2, we can de¯ne the limits
of integration for social welfare implicitly because the choice of improvements
depends on V :
[(1 ¡ µ1)(1 + k1) ¡ (1 ¡ µ0)(1 + k0)]V0 = R + C(k1) ¡ C(k0)
[1 + k2 ¡ (1 ¡ µ0)(1 + k0)]V1 = Q + C(k2) ¡ C(k0)










[(1 ¡ µ1¸)(1 + k1)V ¡ r ¡ C(k1)]dF(V ) (9)









[(1 ¡ µ2¸)(1 + k2)V ¡ ½ ¡ C(k2)]dF(V ) (10)
32The socially optimal pricing vector < R;Q > is di®erent from before,
that is, < r=¸;½=¸ >, since prices should also re°ect the fact that each
system is associated with di®erent levels of land improvement. Recording
and registration are associated with higher capital improvements and thus
generate more value than privacy.
Given the socially optimal prices, if recording has the lowest critical value
(V0 · V1), recording should be preferred to registration if and only if it










f[(1 ¡ µ1¸)(1 + k1) ¡ (1 ¡ µ2¸)(1 + k2)]V
+½ ¡ r + C(k2) ¡ C(k1)gdF(V ) ¸ 0
(11)
Yet, if registration has the lowest critical value (V0 > V1), recording is










f[(1 ¡ µ1¸)(1 + k1) ¡ (1 ¡ µ2¸)(1 + k2)]V
+½ ¡ r + C(k2) ¡ C(k1)gdF(V ) < 0
(12)
In (11), the ¯rst term is positive: a recording system is better for these
parcels of land because under a registration system, only privacy takes place.
It is reinforced by the fact that investment in land improvements is lowest
under privacy. The last term is negative because highly valuable parcels
33of land should be registered rather than recorded. Again notice that this
e®ect is also reinforced because investment is highest under registration and
not under recording. In (12), the two terms are negative: registration is
unambiguously preferred to recording.
Appendix C: Formal Model with Adverse Se-
lection
We develop here a model of adverse selection for land transactions under
di®erent titling systems. The hidden information underlying the adverse
selection problem is the standing of the land title, that is, we assume that
the seller has better information than the buyer concerning the marginal
cost of forfeiture due to future claims. The buyer knows that µi, where i =
0;1;2 stands for privacy, recording and registration respectively, is uniformly
distributed in the interval [0; ¹ µi]. Furthermore 0 < ¹ µ2 < ¹ µ1 < ¹ µ0 < 1, that is,
the highest marginal cost of forfeiture is greater under privacy than under
recording, and lower under registration. The probability density function is
1=¹ µi and the cumulative density function is µi=¹ µi. The expected value of the
distribution is ¹ µi=2, that is, on average, we expect a higher marginal forfeiture
cost under privacy than under recording or registration.
The buyer values the parcel of land of V B and the seller values the same
parcel of land of V S, with V S < V B, both common knowledge. We also
assume that (1 ¡ ¹ µi=2)V B < V S < V B < 2V S since, otherwise, there would
be no adverse selection problem, the buyer would be willing to pay V S and
the seller would always be willing to sell.
The price P is o®ered by the buyer to the seller in a competitive market
(therefore, a zero pro¯t constraint will be imposed as a participation con-
straint for the buyer) with hidden information. The expected payo® for the
risk neutral seller is P ¡ (1 ¡ µi)V S. Given the price P, the seller accepts
34the o®er as long as µi is greater than 1¡P=V S. Here we can see the adverse
selection problem. For a given P o®ered by the buyer, the seller is only
willing to sell if the marginal cost of forfeiture (unknown for the buyer) is
reasonably high. Parcels of land with high quality titles will not be traded,
unless of course P = V S.
The expected payo® for the buyer is given by (1 ¡ µa
i )V B ¡ P, where
µa
i is the expected marginal cost of forfeiture conditioned on an o®er being





1 + ¹ µi ¡ P=V S
2
By substituting for µa
i in the expected payo® for the buyer and imposing
a zero-pro¯t constraint, we obtain the following condition for the price P:
(1 ¡ ¹ µi + P=V
S)V
B=2 ¡ P = 0
Solving for the price P, the price and average expected marginal cost of
forfeiture become:
P =
(1 ¡ ¹ µi)V B




1 + ¹ µi ¡ V B=V S
2 ¡ V B=V S
From the de¯nition of P, we can state the following results for a given
pair of land valuations for buyer and seller, V B and V S respectively: (1)
Prices will be highest for registered, in between for recorded, and lowest for
privately held land; (2) The average expected marginal cost of forfeiture is
highest for privately held, in between for recorded, and lowest for registered
land; (3) The adverse selection problem will be less marked for registered, in
between for recorded, and most marked for privately held land.
35Figure 1. Private utility as a function of the value of land under different 
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 36Figure 2. Social welfare as a function of the value of land under different 
titling solutions when V1 > V0 
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 37Figure 3. Social welfare as a function of the value of land under different 
titling solutions when V0 > V1 
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Table 1. Summary of Figure 2 
 
 
0 to V0  V0 to V1  V1 to  
(P-R)/(θ1-θ2) 
(P-R)/(θ1-θ2)  
to highest V 
Optimal titling 
regime in each 
segment 
Privacy Recording  Recording  Registration 
Titling decision 
given recording  Privacy Recording  Recording  Recording 
Titling decision 








Table 2. Summary of Figure 3 
 
 
0 to V1  V1 to V0  V0 to highest V 
Optimal titling regime 
in each segment  Privacy Registration  Registration 
Titling decision given 
recording  Privacy Privacy  Recording 
Titling decision given 
registration  Privacy Registration  Registration 
Gain from choosing 
registration over 
recording 
0  D E 
 